Abstract. An important attack on multi-power RSA (N = p r q) was introduced by Sarkar in 2014, by extending the small private exponent attack of Boneh and Durfee on classical RSA. In particular, he showed that N can be factored efficiently for r = 2 with private exponent d satisfying d < N 0.395 . In this paper, we generalize this work by introducing a new partial key exposure attack for finding small roots of polynomials using Coppersmith's algorithm and Gröbner basis computation. Our attack works for all multi-power RSA exponents e (resp. d) when the exponent d (resp. e) has full size bit length. The attack requires prior knowledge of least significant bits (LSBs), and has the property that the required known part of LSB becomes smaller in the size of e. For practical validation of our attack, we demonstrate several computer algebra experiments.
Introduction
A natural way of speeding up the decryption/signing procedure of RSA based cryptographic schemes is to use a small private exponent d. However, Wiener [22] showed that classical RSA construction becomes insecure when d < . Later, this bound was further improved by Boneh and Durfee [2] to N 0.292 by using results of Coppersmith [6] .
Kocher [15] initiated a new type of attack that obtains information about the bits of d using side-channel techniques in 1996. The idea is to exploit certain weaknesses of the actual implementation (e.g., execution time, power consumption, noise), which in turn reveals some bits of d. In general, the attacker gains information about either consecutive least significant bits (LSBs) or most significant bits (MSBs). Therefore, partial key exposure attacks mostly focus on these two rather specific cases.
Boneh, Durfee and Frankel [3] introduced the first algebraic partial key exposure attack using partial information of d. The attack finds the whole secret exponent d when sufficient partial knowledge of d is known. Coppersmith's algorithm for finding small roots of polynomials is used in such algebraic attacks [6, 5, 4] . This algorithm uses lattice reduction techniques to obtain efficient small roots of certain polynomials (in particular, the LLL algorithm [16] ). Later, new partial key exposure attacks on classical RSA were described by Blömer and May in [1] . We refer to [9, 14] for further partial key exposure attacks on standard RSA.
Notation: Let log denote the logarithm base 2 unless the base is given concretely. We use the following notation throughout this manuscript.
N Multi-power RSA modulus n bitsize of N p, q prime factors of N r integer satisfying the relation N = p r q e RSA public exponent
In this work, we focus on multi-power RSA (also referred as Takagi's RSA or prime power RSA) introduced by Takagi in [21] . One of the motivation of this variant is to speed up the RSA decryption/signing process. More concretely, N = p r q is chosen for two (distinct) primes of same bit length such that r ≥ 2. Then, there are two different ways of generating public/private exponents. The first one imposes the condition ed ≡ 1 mod (p − 1)(q − 1) while the other ed ≡ 1 mod φ(N ), where φ(N ) = p r−1 (p − 1)(q − 1). Decryption of a ciphertext c is computed more efficiently using simply a combination of Hensel lifting and Chinese Remainder Theorem modulo p r and q (see [21] for details). For the multi-power RSA variant when exponents are generated modulo φ(N ), Takagi proved in [21] (r+1) 2 . In [13] , a small private exponent attack is shown for the case when exponents are generated modulo (p − 1)(q − 1). This attack shows that N can be factored if
r+1 . Later, the idea of this work is used in [12] for partial key exposure attacks. For instance, for r = 2 and e ≈ N Our Contribution. In this paper, we provide a new partial key exposure attack on multi-power RSA when the exponents are generated modulo φ(N ). The attack basically uses partial knowledge of LSBs and works for all e (resp. d) when the exponent d (resp. e) has full size bit length.
3 More concretely, we prove the following theorem which generalizes Sarkar's result [20] . Theorem 1. Let r ≥ 2 be an integer and N = p r q be a multi-power RSA modulus, where p and q are distinct primes with the same bit size (i.e., p, q ≈ N We show the improvement of our attack over Sarkar's result in Figure 1 for the case r = 2. Light grey area (indicated by "Sarkar'14") shows the attack region by [20] and darker grey areas are the applicable regions of our attack.
Organization of the paper. In Section 2, we give preliminaries about lattices. In Section 3, we prove our main result, Theorem 1, extending the result of [20] . Section 4 demonstrates several experiments justifying our claims for the multipower RSA moduli of length 1024 or 2048 bits. We conclude the paper in Section 5 and argue the improbability of using our attack for known MSBs by addressing an issue in [12] .
Preliminaries
In this section, we give basic definitions and theorems about lattices. Let v = (a 0 , · · · , a s ) be a vector in R s+1 for some s ≥ 0. We use the Euclidean norm ||v|| of v For a multivariate polynomial f , the norm ||f || of f is the Euclidean norm of its coefficient vector.
m be a set of R-linearly independent vectors with w, m ∈ N >0 and w ≤ m. Then, the lattice L generated by these vectors is
We always work on lattice having full rank, i.e. w = m. We denote dim(L) := w for the dimension of L. Each lattice L can be represented by the following matrix M ∈ GL(w, R):
In this work, the main goal is to find small vectors in such full lattices. Computational complexity of finding the smallest vector in a lattice increases exponentially in dim(L). The reduction algorithm LLL introduced by Lenstra, Lenstra and Lovász [16] is generally used in practice to have an efficient lattice reduction technique for obtaining small enough basis vectors. The following theorem gives an upper bound on the norm of the reduced basis vectors output by the LLL algorithm.
Theorem 2. Let L be a lattice with dim(L) = w as above. The LLL algorithm produces a set of reduced basis vectors {R 1 , · · · , R w } such that
The computational complexity of the LLL algorithm is polynomial in dim(L) and in the maximal bitsize of an entry [19] .
Coppersmith described methods for finding small roots of univariate and bivariate polynomials [4, 5, 6] . The methods can be extended to the polynomials having more variables, but the results become heuristic. Howgrave-Graham [11] reformulated these results and proved the following theorem:
Assume that the number of monomials is less than or equal to w. If the following two conditions hold:
After finding multivariate polynomials carrying a common root over integers, we need to extract this root using Gröbner basis computation. 4 Our main result Theorem 1 is valid under the following assumption:
Assumption 1 Let f 1 , · · · , f k be the polynomials having the desired root over Z for k ≥ 3 computed using LLL reduction. Furthermore, let I be the ideal generated by these polynomials. Then, the algebraic variety of I is zero-dimensional. In particular, the common root can be extracted by computing a Gröbner basis on I.
Since our result in Theorem 1 relies on this assumption, it is heuristic. However, our experiments show that this assumption holds in general (see Section 4). The computational complexity of a Gröbner basis computation can be bounded by a polynomial in log N assuming the number of variables and the maximal degree of input polynomials is fixed [10] .
An Attack with Known LSBs
In this section, we prove our main Theorem 1. Let m, t 1 , t 2 ≥ 0 and define the following shift polynomials:
Recall that y r 0 z 0 = N . Hence, we replace every occurrence of y r z with N in the shift polynomials. Denote new polynomials by g i,j,k (x, y, z). Observe that choosing xy r as the leading monomial of f eM , the leading monomials in g i,j,k 's are of the form x i+j y k+ri−rl z j+t1−l , where l = min k+ri r , j + t 1 .
Algorithm 1 Generating the Lattice L
Input: r ≥ 2; m, t1, t2 ≥ 0 and f eM (x, y, z)
Append x i+j y k+ri−rl z j+t 1 −l to Ord end for end for end for
Replace each occurrence of y r z with N in g a ← a −1 mod eM , where a is the leading coefficient of g
Set i-th row of L to the coefficient vector of h(xX, yY, zZ) ordered w.r.t. Ord Increment i end for Let a denote the leading coefficient. Assuming gcd(a , eM ) = 1, we can multiply g i,j,k 's with the inverse a of their corresponding leading coefficient in Z/(eM ) m Z. Finally, the shift polynomials become
which carry the root (x 0 , y 0 , z 0 ) modulo (eM ) m . We let the coefficient vectors of h i,j,k (xX, yY, zZ) represent the basis vectors of a lattice L. Generation of L is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Note that each polynomial in H generated by Algorithm 1 introduces exactly one new monomial, which is appended to Ord that defines the monomial ordering. Hence, the matrix representing the lattice is lower triangular when each row is ordered with respect to Ord. As a result, the determinant of L is the product of the diagonal entries of the representation matrix. 
Assuming t2 r ≤ t 1 ≤ m, we get as an asymptotic result
which are approximated as in [20] . Neglecting the low order terms as similarly done in related works, the conditions in Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 can be simplified to det(L) < (eM ) wm . In our case, we need
to be satisfied. Plugging in the values for s x , s y , s z and s eM , we obtain a polynomial ρ (r, α, β, δ) with parameters t 1 , t 2 and m. Let t 1 = τ 1 m and t 2 = τ 2 m, and terms of o(m 3 ) contribute to an error term . Next, we take the partial derivative of ρ with respect to τ 1 and τ 2 , and find the values making the derivatives zero to obtain the maximum value of ρ . Finally, for γ := β − δ, when
both derivatives become zero. Plugging in these values in ρ , we get a function ρ(r, α, β, δ). When the tuple (r, α, β, δ) satisfy ρ(r, α, β, δ) < 0, HowgraveGraham's theorem is satisfied. We can extract the root (k, p, q) under Assumption 1, and thus factor N in time polynomial in log N .
Remark 1.
We note that our definition of shift polynomials is similar to the one in [20] . The difference is that we work modulo eM instead of modulo e. Hence, the constant coefficient of f eM changes. Equating M = 1 (i.e., δ = 0), we obtain the result of Sarkar [20] as a corollary of Theorem 1.
Unfortunately, the exact expression of ρ is too complicated to be stated here. Thus, in Table 1 , we provide some numerical values for δ which yields ρ < 0 when β is fixed to 1. We remind that for r = 2 new attack regions are given in Table 1 when either d or e is full-sized.
Experimental Results
In this section, we provide various experimental results. In all of our experiments, we fix d to be full-sized (i.e., β = 1) which is mostly the case in real- Our results are given in Tables 2 and 3 . In all of our experiments, Gröbner basis computation yields to a polynomial of the form y−p giving the factorization of N . For the case when α = β = 1 (which is illustrated in Table 2 ), we would like to highlight that our result in a case is better than the theoretical bound δ ≥ 0.828. However, when e is chosen small (e.g., e = 2 16 + 1), the modulus eM becomes very small when compared to the case α = β = 1. Therefore, the low order terms ignored to simplify the condition to det(L) < (eM )
wm have much higher effect in this case. Thus, the results are a little bit worse than the best possible bound of Theorem 1. Table 2 . Experimental results for α = β = 1. n = 2048 bits for the last row and n = 1024 bits for the rest.
Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper, we show a new partial key exposure attack on multi-power RSA, where N = p r q. The attack takes advantage of known LSBs. Our result in Theorem 1 generalizes the work of Sarkar [20] Table 3 . Experimental results for e = 2 16 + 1, β = 1. n = 2048 bits for the last two rows and n = 1024 bits for the rest. results justifying our claims. Our attack even works in the case when e, d ≈ N . In fact, our experimental result is better than the theoretical bound for this case. This paves the way for a further study: investigating sublattices of the original lattice to improve the theoretical bound. However, this is a hard task because in this case the lattice will not be of full rank and calculating the determinant gets complicated.
One may wonder why our attack is not directly applicable to known MSBs case. Suppose that we know an MSB part d 0 of d. Then, we obtain the equation
whered represents the unknown part of d. Considering this equation as a polynomial, we get F (w, x, y, z) = 1 − ed 0 − ew + x(N − y r − y r−1 z + y r−1 ). Now e, N or ed 0 are possible choices of moduli. The case e is studied in [20] where one cannot benefit from partial knowledge of d as it vanishes. If N is chosen as the modulus, then the trick of replacing each term y r z with N and finding its inverse cannot be applied. That leaves us with the option to choose ed 0 as the modulus. This case actually corresponds to finding a small root of integer equations [4] , not modular equations [5] .
Observe that reducing F modulo ed 0 does not eliminate any variable. In particular, F ed0 and F have the same monomials. Hence, the polynomials derived from LLL may just be those of the form F · g i for nonzero polynomials g i not carrying the desired root. More concretely, the attacker does not obtain any additional information at all although LLL-reduced polynomials carry the root since they have the factor F .
For a recent work, one may see Coron's works [7, 8] about methods to ensure independence between the initial polynomial F and the polynomials derived after LLL reduction 5 . Unfortunately, the tricks used in this work cannot be directly applied with Coron's method. This issue raises questions about the validity of known MSBs attack shown in [12] . The authors do not specify any methodology guaranteeing the independence aforementioned. Their experiments for this case are very far away from the new attack region described by Theorem 1 in their paper. Moreover, the authors also state that in some experiments, they just verified that the LLL-reduced polynomials contain the root. As we explained earlier, this does not have any implication for an attacker to be able to find the root.
